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Human Security as ‘Ethnic Security’ 
in Kosovo 
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In Kosovo, the concept of human security is invoked in a three-fold manner. First of 
all, the international community has applied human security for the purpose of 
maintaining a fragile peace and stability in Kosovo. For the international 
community, maintaining the fragile peace meant tolerating the establishment and 
operationalization of Serbian parallel institutions. This leads to the second 
application of human security: the parallel institutions claim that their existence is 
necessary to provide human security for the Serbian community in Kosovo. 
Consequently, this undermines the capacity of Kosovo’s public institutions to 
exercise legal authority in the north of Kosovo and in other territorial enclaves. 
Parallel to this, Kosovo’s institutions have viewed the human security approach as a 
means to prove the institutional capacity of independent self-government to provide 
inclusive security, welfare, and integration policies for all people in Kosovo, with a 
special emphasis on ethnic minorities. Accordingly, human security is used by 
different actors in Kosovo to pursue different political agendas, which have not 
resulted in achieving the primary goal of furthering human welfare and fulfilment 
beyond mere physical security. To the contrary, the (ab)use of human security has 
created the conditions for fragile governance, protracted ethnic destabilization, and 
stagnating economic and human development. 
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Even after ten years of international administration and two years since its 
independence from Serbia, Kosovo continues to face ethnic and socio-economic 
problems that have the potential to undermine the progress achieved and threaten the 
country’s stability. In 1999 the international community intervened to halt the 
Serbian authorities’ violence against Kosovar Albanians and began its decade-long 
administration of Kosovo, aiming to coordinate reconstruction, maintain law and 
order, protect human rights, and create democratic institutions. From 1999-2008, the 
international administration (UNMIK and its partners) coordinated the deployment 
of over 20,000 NATO troops, provided over three billion Euro in foreign aid, and 
undertook large projects in peace- and institution-building. Despite these 
investments many criticize the international administration for being ineffective in 
satisfying the real needs of the Kosovar population, constructing social trust across 
ethnic communities and in realizing economic recovery and psycho-social 
reconstruction. The international administration is also criticized for deepening 
ethnic fragmentation (consequently strengthening Serbian parallel institutions) 
asserting international primacy, thereby inhibiting local ownership and making 
bottom-up approaches to transition and normalization impossible. Instead of 
supporting the strengthening of the social contract and enhancing the participation of 
all communities in political decision-making, international actors have prioritised 
“short-term security at the price of long-term sustainable peace and economic 
development”.2 
 
This article explores the factors that have undermined the societal progress 
and the improvement of human conditions in Kosovo from a human security 
perspective. Although human security was implicit in the mandates of the 
international administration and local institutions, this article explores how human 
security has been instrumentalized as ‘ethnic security’ in post-conflict Kosovo. In 
particular, we argue that the international administration in Kosovo has undertaken 
activities related to human security primarily seen as conflict resolution and short-
term stability; that the Kosovo institutions use it as a means to justify the self-
governance capacities and act as the principle public services and human security 
provider; and that the Serbian parallel institutions invoke activities similar to human 
security that aim to legitimize their ‘contested’ presence in the enclaves across 
Kosovo. As a consequence of these multiple agencies and their implicit invocation 
of human security we argue that human security has not been an end in itself for 
these three agencies, but has functioned as a means to achieve different political 
agendas. 
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II. A New Approach to Human Security 
 
There is no consensual definition for the scope and the nature of human security. 
However, in a broad sense, it challenges the traditional view of security, which is 
focused on military capabilities and state security, and supports broadening the 
human development paradigm. At its core, human security involves “a change of 
focus from a state-centred understanding of security that is, top-down and 
territorial, to an individual-based and therefore bottom-up and de-territorialized 
model”.3 It reorients the conception of security by considering certain dimensions of 
the concept. ‘Security for whom’ focuses on individuals and peoples and has wider 
meaning for values and goals such as dignity, equity and solidarity.4 ‘Security from 
what’ identifies the agency-based and structural causes of insecurity, such as 
economic threats, personal security threats, environmental threats, and political 
threats.5 Finally, ‘security by what means’ empowers individuals to become 
‘agents’, who can be actively engaged in defining potential security threats, and who 
can participate in efforts to mitigate them.6 The 1994 UNDP Human Development 
Report (HDR) synthesized threats to human security into seven components: 
economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security,7 
while human development focuses on “flourishing or fulfilment of individuals in 
their homes and communities, and the expansion of valuable choices”8, “[t]he 
objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from 
critical pervasive threats, without impeding long-term human fulfilment”.9 
 
Parallel to this, a European conception of human security perceives human 
security as the security of individuals and communities – an interrelationship of 
‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’. 10 A research group convened by the 
EU has elaborated several principles of new conflict management informed by 
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human security. These principles include:  (a) the primacy of human rights that 
distinguishes the human security approach from traditional state-based approaches; 
(b) legitimate political authority, which has enforcement capacity and can gain the 
trust of the population; (c) multilateralism, since the human security approach is 
global, it should be implemented through multilateral action; (d) a bottom-up 
approach, which considers communication, consultation and dialogue with the local 
people as essential tools for both development and security; (e) having a regional 
focus, as new wars have no clear boundaries.11 
 
Nonetheless, as the thinking on human security grows, various critiques 
have questioned its meaning, scope and its political and moral implications. The 
main conceptual criticism concerns its lack of precision: as a concept, it is too broad 
to consider responses to threats, it lacks a concise research agenda, which is 
complicated by its inter-disciplinarity and inter-sectorality. Concerning the political 
implications of human security, Buzan is sceptic about its effect and sees it as “a 
new tool for existing governing agencies to shape and control civil populations” and 
argues that “[h]uman security remains state-centric despite the supranational 
dimensions of the concept, allowing for a prominent role of the state as a necessary 
condition for individual security”.12 
 
Moving from theory to practice, it is clear that human security is 
increasingly employed in post-conflict situations. From Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
Timor-Leste, Kosovo and Afghanistan, the comprehensive nature of these 
interventions, including democratic institution-building, civil society assistance, 
economic development, human rights promotion, reckoning with war crimes and so 
on, corresponds closely to key human security concerns.13 Learning from these 
cases, the Report of the Commission on Human Security (CHS) called for a new 
framework and a funding strategy that rebuilds conflict-torn states and focuses on 
the protection and empowerment of people. Such a human security framework, 
according to CHS must “emphasize the linkages among the many issues affecting 
people, such as ensuring people’s safety through strengthening civilian police and 
demobilizing combatants; meeting immediate needs of displaced people; launching 
reconstruction and development; promoting reconciliation and coexistence; and 
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advancing effective governance”.14 Furthermore, CHS recognizes that in conflict 
situations it is necessary to go beyond peacekeeping and peace-building presence by 
“setting up unified leadership for all actors close to the delivery point of human 
security.”15 
 
However, the invocation of human security as a strategy to deal with many 
issues in underdeveloped societies, war-torn territories, and weak or fragile states 
poses several challenges. For instance, engaging different national and international 
agencies to provide human security can undermine the development of a single 
political structure being responsible for delivering services to its constituents and 
accountable through democratic mechanisms. On the other hand, assisting weak 
governments is considered a sustainable approach to deliver public security and 
welfare services, but risks the long-term goal of improving human rights and 
investment in people. Thus, a balanced approach of having functional and 
accountable public institutions that ensure equilibrium between public security for 
the public domain and at the same time investing in humans through prioritizing 
education, health, and social welfare would be an ultimate strategy to ensure overall 
societal stability and development. However idealistic this may sound, effective aid 
and political conditionality combined with on-ground assistance would serve as a 
mechanism to ensure gradual progress thereto. 
 
III. The (Ab)Use of Human Security in Kosovo 
 
As a concept, human security has not been explicitly used to describe the mandate of 
international administration and international organizations; nor was it employed by 
the Kosovo government as an integrated and guiding strategy for development. 
However, if we deconstruct the goals of the international administration in Kosovo 
(including UNMIK, the donor community, and EULEX) we notice that their 
mandate and activities implicitly reflect the concept of human security. Canadian 
Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy called the NATO presence in Kosovo a new 
security vocation seeing the defence of human security as a global concern and the 
humanitarian imperative that galvanised NATO into action.16 Similarly, the Kosovar 
government has established an institutional and legal environment to facilitate 
human security and design policies and funding dedicated to sectors that aim to 
provide human security. Meanwhile, the Serbian parallel institutions provide public 
services, health and education for the Serbian population in Kosovo, activities that 
are directly related to the human security agenda. In the following sections, we 
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explore the main factors that have undermined human security in Kosovo. These 
are: the nature of the international presence in Kosovo; legacies of top-down 
approaches; the primacy of stability and ethnic security; the multiplicity of political 
authorities; the politics of institution-building; widespread corruption and finally the 
presence of Serbian parallel structures. 
 
A. The Nature of the International Presence in Kosovo 
 
The nature and open-ended mandate of the UN international administration of 
Kosovo created conditions that later undermined the functioning of Kosovo 
institutions, local sovereignty and social cohesion. The Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General (SRSG) was the head of UNMIK and the highest international 
civilian official in Kosovo. Indeed the SRSG enjoyed “maximum civilian executive 
powers envisaged and vested in him by the Security Council in its resolution 1244 
(1999), and will also be the final authority on their interpretation [...]”.17 UNMIK 
was structured around four pillars. The first two pillars, coordinated by UNMIK, 
dealt with public security issues and the judicial system, and managed domestic 
public administration and the international civilian presence. The third pillar was 
administrated by OSCE, which dealt with democratization through institution 
building, strengthening local police and municipal authorities, as well as promoting 
the rule of law and an independent media and active civil society. The forth pillar 
mandated the EU to undertake economic reconstruction and development, including 
privatisation, customs and property issues. With such a broadly-mandated 
international administration, UNMIK “suffered from having too many masters”.18 
 
From 1999-2003, the international community delayed transferring power to 
local institutions, and did little to promote local ownership of reconstruction 
processes. This was partly due to Kosovo’s unresolved political status and the fear 
that any transfer of power to Kosovo’s local institutions would be seen by Serbs in 
Kosovo as threat. In an attempt to ‘balance’ these fears, SRSG Michael Steiner 
outlined a series of benchmarks in April 2002, which “should be achieved before 
launching a discussion on status”.19 Following consultations with the PISG, 
UNMIK formulated these benchmarks as ‘Standards for Kosovo’ in December 2003 
and unveiled a more complex and ambitious ‘Kosovo Standards Implementation 
Plan’ on 31 March 2004. These ‘standards’ incorporated critical areas such as “rule 
of law, functioning democratic institutions, the economy, freedom of movement, the 
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return of internally displaced persons and refugees and contributions to regional 
stability”.20 
 
While these issue areas correspond clearly to the fulfilment of the 
requirement of normative and democratic legitimacy, and overall stabilization of 
Kosovo, it is questionable whether these standards reflect ‘conditional sovereignty’ 
or represent a ‘delaying strategy’ to avoid addressing Kosovo’s status in order to 
maintain the immediate necessity for ‘negative’ peace and stability on the ground. 
While these standards reflect human security concerns, many commentators argue 
that they were aimed at delaying discussion of Kosovo’s future (final) political 
status. It was argued that this delay aimed to incorporate Serbs into Kosovo 
institutions and society, according to the international mandate. Nonetheless, the 
incremental transferral of competence to the locals made both Serbs and Albanians 
sceptical about their future prospects in Kosovo. Instead of creating and investing in 
domestic conditions, which would provide durable peace and human security in 
Kosovo, the policy of the international community in Kosovo was shaped by a pre-
occupation with stability. Accordingly, Dominik Zaum argues that “such a policy 
[...] makes the international presence a condition of stability, rather than an 
instrument to attain self-sustained peace.”21 
 
Discussions on the determination of Kosovo’s final status also illustrate a 
lack of local ownership. In 2005, the process of defining a future (final) status for 
Kosovo final status was initiated and the UN Security Council appointed Martti 
Ahtisaari as Special Envoy to mediate between Serbia and Kosovo. Negotiations 
ended without mutual agreement and Martti Ahtisaari proposed ‘supervised 
independence’ for Kosovo, with broad decentralization for the Serbian community 
and an EU ‘monitoring’ mission to supervise the plan’s implementation and the rule 
of law and justice. However, the drafters of this proposal engaged only with donor-
driven agents of civil society22, which was not an adequate representation of the 
people who would be affected by the proposal. Only a Kosovar movement 
demanding self-determination travelled to areas which were to be decentralized and 
provided the local population with a platform for their concerns. According to 
Vetëvendosje, “through decentralization, Serbia is intending to expand and define 
the borders of enclaves, create continuous territory through enclaves with the 
planned return of Serbs by the government of Serbia, take the high peaks of hills and 
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mountains with undisputable strategic and military importance, and legitimize its 
parallel structures in Kosovo.”23 
 
After the failure of UNSC to approve the Ahtisaari plan, the ‘people of 
Kosovo’ issued the unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia on 17 
February 2008. To date, Kosovo has been recognized by over 67 states and has also 
been accepted as full member of the IMF and the World Bank.24 Expressing their 
anger at Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, local Serbs from Mitrovica (the 
northern part of Kosovo), in reaction to the Kosovo declaration of independence, 
destroyed two custom points in northern Kosovo. In December 2008, the EU Rule of 
Law Mission (EULEX) was deployed in Kosovo, the biggest EU civilian mission 
enacted under the (then) European Defense and Security Policy (EDSP). According 
to the Barcelona Report, human security missions should be led by a civilian25 but 
this is not the case with the EULEX, which is led by a former Kosovo KFOR 
General, Yves de Kermabon. Although EULEX is tasked to monitor, mentor and 
assist Kosovo’s own authorities, including police, justice and customs26, Kosovo 
still faces problems regarding justice, the court system and corruption. EULEX, in 
cooperation with the Kosovar government, is working on a strategy to integrate 
Mitrovica, (which has been ruled by Serbian parallel institutions since 1999) into the 
Kosovo political system and make Kosovo law applicable in the area. 
 
As seen here, one of the major challenges for international administrations 
in post-conflict situations is finding a balance between goals that incorporate both 
immediate social needs and long-term political goals. While the latter includes 
ensuring physical security, promoting economic reconstruction and building 
political institutions to transfer powers to local institutions, immediate social needs 
include returning people to their homes, providing them with adequate living 
conditions, health and social welfare services. As demonstrated by Kosovo, 
international administrations often try to cover all these sectors at the same time. As 
a result of trying to prioritize the issues of ethnic relations and ensuring immediate 
results to maintain peace and stability, international administrations often neglect 
economic development, employment generation and rural development. While many 
other international and local NGO’s try to bridge this gap, a lack of operational 
coordination and overlapping activities often result in ignoring essential areas 
including, water, energy and infrastructural development. Thus, one of the generic 
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problems of international administrations is seeing human security through the lens 
of physical security at “ignoring the role that equitable economic development can 
play towards peace.”27 
 
B. Legacies of Top-down Approaches 
 
The ‘legitimacy dynamics’ of the international administration in Kosovo have 
evolved over time. In the first years after the war UNMIK enjoyed public support 
and cooperation for delivering its mandate for societal reconstruction. However, as 
time passed and the promised progress was not achieved, the Kosovars’ supportive 
perception of UNMIK began to change. According to UNDP polls, over 60% of 
Kosovars were satisfied with UNMIK work in 2002, while by 2009 support has 
decreased to approximately 10%, and people no longer consider UNMIK as a 
responsible authority in Kosovo.28 The sustainable transformation of Kosovar 
society cannot be achieved without a meaningful bottom-up process, which would 
incorporate people’s concerns into political agendas. The efforts to divide tasks 
among different actors, including UN agencies, OSCE, EU, and NATO proved 
unsuccessful. Instead, they employed “a top-down policy in nearly all dimensions of 
the civilizing process and its related human rights functions, which led to an 
alienation of democratically elected representatives of the Kosovo people from state 
responsibilities.”29 Thus, this top-down approach of institution-building ultimately 
led to a ‘top-down local democracy’ which did not answer to people’s concrete 
needs. A bottom-up approach, as described in the Barcelona Report, means that 
“involving marginal groups and civil society actors, is not only a matter of moral 
but effectiveness as well.”30 It seems that this recommendation was not considered 
by UNMIK administration in Kosovo. 
 
Nonetheless, to avoid citizen dependency and to promote domestic 
participatory processes, the key guiding principles of development policy should 
have been partnership, local ownership and participation. As Kaldor advocates, 
“people who live in zones of insecurity are the best source of intelligence. Thus 
communication, consultation and dialogue are essential tools for both development 
and security, not simply to win hearts and minds but in order to gain knowledge and 
understanding.”31 In particular, the exclusion of sensitive groups, such as former 
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combatants encouraged them to engage in spoiling behaviour, which threatened to 
undermine progress. Similarly, as experienced in many post-conflict settings, the 
exclusion of groups with special needs can lead to unintended consequences, where 
“spoilers oppose the peaceful settlement for whatever reason, from within or 
(usually) outside the peace process, and who use violence or other means to disrupt 
the process in pursuit of their aims.”32 Excluded groups can easily use “the peace 
process as a means of gaining recognition and legitimacy, gaining time, gaining 
material benefit, or avoiding sanctions.”33 
 
Nevertheless, using the terminology of the Madrid Report on a European 
Way of Security, the successful implementation of human security in Kosovo is 
undermined for a number of reasons, including a lack of a coherent bottom-up 
approach; no consultation with civil society in legislation and policy-making; 
insufficient attempts at institutionalising consultation mechanisms to redirect 
ownership to Kosovars; failure to engage minorities directly (e.g. Kosovo Serbs); 
and continued existence of low standards of accountability, capacity, corruption 
leading to local mistrust.34 The rise of NGOs in Kosovo has also been accompanied 
by the fear that civil society organizations are not driven by authentic and deep-
rooted needs, but embark on projects to meet the requirements of their foreign 
donors.35Although NGOs are associated with the promotion of human rights, inter-
ethnic dialogue and democratization, their intentions and good-will are questioned 
as they prioritize their activities based on the requests of the donors (top-down 
approach) rather than the needs of community. Instead of pursuing a bottom-up 
approach to address people’s needs, civil society has been criticized for attending to 
donor agendas and self-interested motivation. Consequently, the public continues to 
have a low level of acceptance of NGO work, largely because of misconceptions 
about their role and function.36 This also raises concerns regarding the validity of the 
proclaimed values of civil society to address societal problems. It also raises 
suspicion that civil society uses human security as a ‘trendy’ label to attract funding 
from the donor community. For example, major donors such as USAID and UNDP 
have prioritised activities related to human security such as security, justice, 
economic, social protection, environment, gender, youth, corruption, conflict 
mitigation, and human capacity development, and make funding conditional upon 
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these priority areas.37 In this context, one can argue that the top-down approach to 
institution-building in Kosovo lacked local legitimacy and was mainly constructed 
from above by international administration. According to this interpretation, the 
international community used civil society as a mechanism to address and reach the 
public through their policies, undermining its role as a place for people to raise their 
concerns and problems with the international administration of Kosovo. 
 
C. Between Stability and Ethnic Security  
 
One of the main problems concerning the international administration of Kosovo 
and other war-torn territories is the focus on achieving some kind of ‘stability’ and 
ethnic security, rather than approaching all citizens equally. At first glance, the 
argument made by Doyle and Sambanis that “the deeper the hostility, the more the 
destruction of local capacities, the more one needs international assistance to 
succeed in establishing a stable peace”38, seems true, at least in theory. But in 
practice, the international community perceives stability and stable peace as 
involving a number of aspects, including the absence of ethnic confrontation; 
humanitarian aid; conflict resolution; and economic redevelopment. Together, these 
are the preconditions of regional stability. However, instead of creating a society of 
“fair and just governance that would be able to satisfy human needs regardless of 
communal or identity cleavages, and promote communal harmony and social 
stability”39, the transition period in Kosovo has involved accommodating elites, who 
‘represent’ ethnic interests and ignore the needs of the whole community. 
Consequently, perceiving stability through the lens of ethnic relations, rather than 
focusing on the needs of individuals, led to controversy about the consolidation of 
development and governance, which questions to what extent this consolidation 
brought ethnic elites personal and communal leverage. Nonetheless, if this approach 
was intended as conflict prevention and management, then it ultimately failed to 
address the people’s needs and created a fragile ethnic environment.  
 
Kosovo still has one of the least developed economies in Europe: according 
to a World Bank estimate, approximately 45 percent of the population live in 
poverty and 15 percent live in extreme poverty40. The recent global financial crisis 
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also affected Kosovo, albeit indirectly. Foreign investment and the foreign presence 
declined, reduced Diaspora remittance is taking effect, and many small businesses 
have closed.41 Certainly this situation threatens stability and further deepens poverty. 
The 2006 Internal Security Sector Review Report in Kosovo (ISSR) warns that the 
“threat of internal division in Kosovo remains present and may increase if economic 
and unemployment issues are not comprehensively addressed.”42 The same report 
goes further by arguing that the “infrastructure problems, such as the inadequate 
provision of electric power, undermine economic growth and have the capacity to 
spark public protest.”43 Although the international community has largely focused 
on the issue of inter-ethnic violence, the ISSR found that “for the people of Kosovo 
high unemployment, a lack of economic development and widespread poverty have 
created an atmosphere of insecurity.”44 Furthermore, despite extensive international 
aid for reconstruction, Kosovo’s economy was unable to recover in a situation where 
potential private investors did not know whether they were investing in a province 
of Serbia or a future independent Kosovo’.45 Arguably, “[e]conomic instability has 
exacerbated problems such as ethnic violence, corruption, increased crime rates 
and contributed to a growth in mistrust of Kosovo’s key institutions of government, 
both international and indigenous”.46 This certainly poses threats to the principles 
of human security of putting people first and treating them equally, a threat reflected 
in the different concerns of the two groups. While most Kosovo-Serbs see the 
potential aggravation of ethnic relations as the main threat to stability, for Kosovo-
Albanians, unemployment and poverty are the greatest threats to stability.47 
 
D. Human Insecurity Due to Multiple Political Authorities 
 
In order to maintain a stable situation, the international community allowed the 
establishment of more than one political authority. Rather than focusing equally on 
the needs of individuals, the international community approached peacekeeping, 
development assistance and governance issues from an ethnic perspective. This 
strategy failed to create conditions to facilitate the consolidation of a single and 
legitimate political authority in Kosovo, which would facilitate human security. On 
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the contrary, this strategy contributed to ‘human insecurity’ resulting from multiple 
political agencies. In principle, we agree that “human security depends on the 
existence of legitimate institutions that gain the trust of the population and have 
some enforcement capacity.”48 As illustrated in Kosovo, the failure to create a single 
and legitimate authority and the toleration of the establishment of Serbian parallel 
institutions had the unintended consequence of ‘authority diffusion’, which, in turn, 
led to unclear allocation of authority and multiple centres of governance in Kosovo, 
which are overlapping, conflicting and unnecessary. 
 
Indeed, Kaldor argued that “legitimate political authority does not 
necessarily need to mean a state; it could consist of local government or regional or 
international political arrangements like protectorates or transitional 
administrations.”49 However, the flaws of the political authority in Kosovo made it 
virtually impossible to increase the level of human security.  Concerning the sources 
of legitimacy, UNMIK and the international community justified their extensive 
authority to run post-conflict reconstruction, by invoking the need to consolidate of 
political and economic institutions and to create conditions and a political space for 
a lasting peace. On the other hand, Kosovo institutions believed that they were the 
legitimate political authority, elected through democratic elections and responsible 
for the state-building process. Meanwhile, the Serbian parallel institutions claimed 
to be the legitimate political representatives of the Serbian population in Kosovo, 
due to what they considered a failure of the international community and Albanian 
population of Kosovo to protect Serbs after the war in Kosovo. 
 
The main problem is that these three ‘legitimate political authorities’ in 
Kosovo pursued three different political agendas. Such ambiguous priorities and 
actors produced limited results for addressing the socio-economical needs of people 
in Kosovo. While the international community aimed to implement UNSC 
Resolution 1244 (1999) and to maintain a stable situation on the ground through its 
overwhelming civil, police, and military presence, the democratically-elected 
institutions of Kosovo aimed at state-building by creating conditions for the 
declaration of independence and statehood. On the other hand, the Serbian parallel 
institutions operating in the north of Kosovo and other enclaves within Kosovo 
provide a wide range of services, from providing public services, education and 
health, to issuing documents, in order to undermine the new political space created 
in Kosovo. As such, parallel structures constitute a major challenge and require 
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E. Human (In)Security: Parallel Structures in Kosovo 
 
As a consequence of the 1999 conflict, most Serbs living in urban areas left Kosovo, 
while those who were scattered in rural areas remained. After the NATO-led troops 
and UNMIK administration were deployed in Kosovo, “200.000 ethnic Serbs fled 
the province […] due to fear, intimidations, and direct physical violence.”50 
Immediately after the war, Serbs established parallel structures in Kosovo, which 
relied heavily on the support and guidance of the Belgrade authorities. These 
parallel structures were created with the aim of undermining the UN administration 
of Kosovo and later the Albanian self-governing local institutions. 
 
These parallel structures arguably aim to create a situation that increases 
Serbs’ distrust towards Kosovo institutions. Ultimately, they create the conditions 
for resettlement or another division of Kosovo along ethnic lines. It seems that these 
structures were developed to give Belgrade the ability to impose control over local 
Serbs, to manipulate and destabilize processes in Kosovo, and ultimately to hold 
bargaining incentives for Serbia’s own national political and economic interests. 
Despite the fact that these parallel structures are ill-organized, they continue to 
operate and pose a direct threat to the functioning of Kosovo’s institutions within 
areas populated by Serbs, and to the overall territorial integrity and internal security 
of Kosovo. Serbia continues to strengthen this network of parallel structures, which 
provide administrative, education and health services for the 120,000 Serbs in 
Kosovo. The Belgrade government continued to hold election within Serb areas of 
Kosovo and considers their parallel structures as legitimate representation. Indeed, 
these parallel institutions constitute a significant obstacle to the representation and 
participation of Serbs in Kosovo's institutions. 
 
As noted by the European Centre for Minority Issues, “most Kosovo Serbs 
boycotted the elections of 17 November, 2007, and instead voted in the Serbian 
elections of 11 May, 2008, electing their representatives to the so called Assembly 
of the Community of Municipalities of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and 
Metohija”51 and new mayors of Kosovo Serb parallel municipalities. Members of 
the Serbian community often make use of parallel administrations, which were 
elected in the 11 May 2008 parallel elections, organised by Serbia and declared 
illegal by the UN.52 There is an “extensive network of parallel, Serbian language 
schools run by the Serbian government in Kosovo, which further hinders integration 
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of Serb pupils into Kosovo educational structures.”53 Moreover, “doctors and other 
health personnel working for the parallel health institutions, in addition to salaries 
received by Kosovo government, also receive salaries from the Serbian 
government.”54 In addition, during 2008 and 2009 most Serbian members of the 
Kosovo Police boycotted their jobs and returned to work only after Belgrade ordered 
them to do so. Significantly, these interferences show the tendencies of Serbia to 
exercise control over the Kosovo Serbs and to play an important role in domestic 
politics. 
 
However, we argue that the Government of Serbia did not support the 
Serbian parallel structures to maintain human security. On the contrary, the 
Government of Serbia has used the parallel structures to demonstrate its presence 
and desire to cement the partition of Kosovo. In 2008, Serbia has maintained the 
parallel system with €1,332,463, out of which 81% were directed to northern 
Kosovo, as the biggest Serbian enclave in Kosovo. 55 Estimations indicate that €2.9 
million was invested in 2009.56 The Serbian government repeatedly states that it 
does not support the Serb participation in Kosovo’s local elections in November 
2009. The State Secretary in the Ministry for Kosovo in the Serbian Government, 
Oliver Ivanovic, confirmed the decision that Serbia does not support the elections in 
Kosovo is an order. Ivanovic further reaffirmed Serbia’s parallel structures in 
Kosovo saying that “Serbia now has its local self-governing institutions in Kosovo, 
and how effective they are we can talk all the day long, but Serbia will not give up 
these institutions.”57 This illustrates Belgrade’s interference and its continued 
tendency to threaten local Serbs to participate in Kosovo’s political life. As OSCE 
notes, in order to address the key factors that have determined the continuation of 
parallel structures, UNMIK and Kosovo institutions must meet the demands of the 
local Serbs, such as economic development, freedom of movement, supervised 
returnee, security and gain their confidence and reduce the capacity of the parallel 
system, increase the Kosovo government structures services and, ultimately, 
dismantle the Serbian parallel structures.58 
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F. Political Battle Between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ 
 
Political parties are still organized along ethnic lines in Kosovo. The Kosovo 
Albanian parties, who populate most institutions in Kosovo, were not pro-active in 
appealing for protection of Kosovo Serbs. On the other hand, the predominant 
political leadership in Kosovo was not using productive language with regards to 
integrating Serbs in Kosovo. Since 2000, when voter turnout reached 79 % in the 
municipal elections, Kosovo political leaders believed it was not in their interest to 
play their power game outside the realm of ethnicity. National elections were held in 
November 2001, and Kosovo Serbs participated in the political system and their 
political coalition Povratak (Return) won 11 % of the votes. LDK (Democratic 
League of Kosovo) and PDK (Democratic League of Kosovo) created a broad 
coalition, and international community welcomed and applauded the participation of 
Serbs. 
 
Simon Chesterman argues that frequent elections in Kosovo were held in 
order to maintain the status quo and fragile stability. 59 He cites an OSCE 
representative who said that “[e]lections will buy us three years of stability”. 60 
Accordingly, elections were portrayed as non-violent political activity and were 
intended to create a moderate leadership, include Serbs ‘in the system’ and highlight 
the absence of alternatives.61 However, the OSCE projection was not accurate. Serbs 
boycotted the 2002 and 2007 elections and a moderate political leadership did not 
emerge. From 2002 onward, the pattern of zero sum game among Kosovo Albanian 
and Kosovo Serb political leadership has prevailed as a model for politics. 
Constructing a political battle of ‘Us’ against ‘Them’ was the easiest way to gain 
political legitimacy. Albanian leadership and Serbian leadership failed to address 
and solve the fundamental problems of their respective community, and attributed 
the ‘causes’ of the problem to ‘others’. 
 
Simonsen argues that it is in the self-interest of political leaders to present 
themselves as defenders of their ethnic groups.62 By doing so, ethnic leaders 
increase their political strength and fuel the ethnicization of the conflict, as reflected 
in the voting behaviour in Kosovo: “Serbs will vote for Serb parties and Albanians 
for Albanian parties in Kosovo.”63 Although Serbs and other minorities are 
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guaranteed representation in Kosovo institutions, as long as voting behaviour is 
conducted along ethnic lines, the “quotas are not enough to realize UNMIK’s 
ambition of rooting ‘multi-ethnicity’ in Kosovo.”64 Perhaps time is running out, as 
Kosovars are increasingly disappointed with their political leadership, and their 
public participation is rapidly decreasing. Voter turnout has decreased from 79 % 
from the 2000 elections to 49.52 % in the election of 2004 and 39.4 % in the 2007 
elections. The international community in Kosovo should work to remove the ‘zero 
sum game’ mentality of Kosovo’s elite politicians, and to undermine their position 
as the real ‘defenders’ of their respective ethnic groups. To do so, it will be 
necessary to promote inter-communal elite cooperation and to empower the human 
security in Kosovo as centred on individuals, not ethnicity. 
 
G. Corrupting Human Security 
 
The 2009 Freedom House Report for Kosovo acknowledges the stability of national 
democratic governance, which continues to improve the functioning of institutions, 
and election processes are considered ‘free and fair’ by observers. Despite the 
acknowledged progress, Freedom House places Kosovo under the category of 
‘partially free country’, pointing out further challenges in addressing widespread 
corruption, strengthening institutions, establishing an integrated Kosovo, and laying 
the foundation for Kosovo’s economic development. The Office of the Auditor 
General has shown unnecessary annual losses up to 1.5 million Euros in each 
ministry. The 2008 EU Commission progress report identifies corruption as a 
widespread problem in Kosovo and devotes an entire section to Anti-Corruption 
policy. The EU Commission progress report identifies three reasons for the 
persistence of wide-spread corruption in Kosovo: insufficient legislation; 
implementing measures and, weakness of the judicial system.65 Parallel to this, the 
EU progress report points out that “[t]he legal framework needs to be further 
improved to remedy differences in the definition of corruption between the current 
anti-corruption law and the provisional penal code.”66 Furthermore, the Kosovo 
Anti-Corruption Agency in its report of 2008 submitted 53 cases to the prosecution 
and explained that the suspected institutions of corruption in Kosovo are 
government, public enterprises, courts and local government.67 
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In this respect, Kaufman identified an interesting correlation between civil 
freedoms and corruption.68 He concludes that countries with low levels of freedom 
have high levels of corruption, while countries with high levels of civil freedoms 
possess low levels of corruption. Based on this, Kosovo remains a country with 
widely limited freedoms and very widespread corruption. Indeed, Kosovo’s political 
leadership has failed to be transparent with regards to financing their political 
campaigns, and declaring their own assets. Widespread corruption hindered the 
establishment of legitimate institution and the cultivation of a mature political 





Kosovo illustrates how the political dimensions of human security can be 
undermined, misused and misapplied in post-conflict situations, due to the interests 
of different authorities. These authorities (whether international, national or illegal) 
can invoke human security for different purposes, including maintaining stability, 
managing ethnic relations, and building statehood institutions and practices. This 
analysis of Kosovo illustrates how human security can be used as ethnic security. 
The international community applied political strategies informed by human security 
for the purpose of maintaining fragile peace and stability in Kosovo. Consequently, 
this approach tolerated the establishment and operationalization of Serbian parallel 
institutions, which continue to undermine the capacity of Kosovo’s public 
institutions to exercise legal authority in northern Kosovo. Moreover, the Kosovar 
institutions have viewed the human security approach as a means to prove the 
institutional capacity of independent self-government to provide inclusive security, 
welfare, and integration policies for all people in Kosovo, with a special emphasis 
on ethnic minorities. However, as long as there are two parallel political and social 
systems, Kosovo cannot establish an integrated, cohesive and multiethnic society. 
 
As Kosovo illustrates the limits of multiple political authorities and 
‘uncoordinated multilateralism’, we propose that some of the principles invoked in 
the Human Security Doctrine for Europe need to be reformed and applied correctly. 
For instance, these principles suggest that transitional international administration 
can serve as ‘legitimate political authority’. However it is important that the 
international governance of post-conflict territories is short, focused and effective, 
otherwise ‘protractedness’ and ‘extensiveness’ risks undermining local governance 
with potential implications for long term peace and stability, for contributing to a 
deficit in democratic governance, and for weakening local sovereignty. Furthermore, 
multilateralism seems to be problematic as different organizations pursue different 
agendas. Perhaps it is important to revise this principle and promote a more narrow 
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coordination of aid assistance and avoid unnecessary multiplicity of projects through 
establishing sector-based coordination agencies and involve from the beginning 
local authorities as well. 
 
The article argued that a protracted and extensive international 
administration endangers the consolidation and recognition of a single legitimate 
political authority, which should play an important role in post-conflict 
normalization. Alongside weak social and economic conditions and fragile ethnic 
relations, the extensive mandate of multiple international agencies, minimal local 
ownership of decision-making, the existence of illegal and parallel structures, 
ultimately undermines (and abuses) the primary goal of achieving human security 
and sustainable peace in post-conflict situations. Therefore, dismantling Serbian 
parallel structures is necessary to allow the rule of law to prevail in Kosovo. A 
coordinated effort of Albanian political leadership, Serbian political representatives 
in Kosovo institutions, and the new international presence should employ a 
functioning human security framework for Northern Kosovo, to provide 
communities access to an integrated system of public services, education, health, 
social welfare, development assistance, and local self-governance. In order to make 
human security a reality in Kosovo there should be sufficient political will and 
commitment from all parties engaged to put people first and treat them equally 
despite their ethnic, religious or linguistic background. 
